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viernes, 3 de diciembre de 2010

Cable que relata la ayuda que México necesita de EE UU

  • En octubre de 2009 la Embajada informa de una reunión de las autoridades mexicanas mantenida con altos funcionarios de la fiscalía general estadounidense


ID:228419
Date:2009-10-05 20:26:00
Origin:09MEXICO2882
Source:Embassy Mexico
Classification:CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination:INFO LOG-00 AF-00 AID-00 CIAE-00 CPR-00 INL-00 DODE-00 
DOEE-00 PERC-00 DS-00 OIGO-00 FBIE-00 VCI-00 H-00
TEDE-00 INR-00 LAB-01 L-00 MOFM-00 MOF-00 VCIE-00
DCP-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00 OMB-00 NIMA-00 PA-00 PM-00 
PRS-00 P-00 ISNE-00 FMPC-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 
NCTC-00 ASDS-00 IIP-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 
G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 FA-00 SWCI-00 PESU-00 SANA-00
/001W

O 052026Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8484
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO PRIORITY
CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
HQ USNORTHCOM PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
US MARSHALS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 002882 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2019 
TAGS: KCRM, PGOV, SNAR, MX 
SUBJECT: ELEMENTS OF GOM POLICY TEAM INTERESTED IN FOCUSING 
TOGETHER ON IMPROVING SECURITY IN A FEW KEY CITIES 

Classified By: NAS Director Keith Mines, reasons 1.5 (b) (d) 


1. (C) Summary: At a dinner hosted by PGR for a visiting DOJ 
delegation, National Security Coordinator Tello Peon and 
Undersecretary for Governance Gutierrez Fernandez told the 
delegation they would like to explore seriously focusing our 
joint efforts on two or three key cities to reverse the 
current wave of violence and instability and show success in 
the fight against the DTOs in the next 18 months. They 
suggested starting in Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, and one other 
city with a joint planning cell to review what resources we 
could collectively bring to bear. They believe the symbolism 
of turning several of the most violent cities would be 
potent, sending a signal to the rest of the country that the 
fight against organized crime can be won, and combating the 
current sense of impotence felt by many Mexicans. They 
believe it would also go a long way toward stitching up the 
country,s damaged international reputation. End Summary. 

2. (U) Acting Attorney General Alcantara hosted a dinner for 
Deputy Attorney General for the Criminal Division Lanny 
Breuer September 21 in Mexico City. Other attendees 
included: 

GOM 
National Security System Coordinator Jorge Tello Peon 
Undersecretary for Governance (SEGOB) Geronimo Gutierrez 
Fernandez 
PGR DAG (SIEDO) Marisela Morales 
PGR DAG Victor Emilio Corzo Cabanas 
PGR Director for Analysis and Strategic Information Oscar 
Rocha Dobrowski 

US 
Deputy Assistant AG Bruce Swartz 
Deputy Assistant AG for Criminal Division Kenneth Blanco 
Special Assistant to the AG Paul Rosen 
DOJ Attache Tony Garcia 
NAS Director Keith Mines 

GOM WANTS FULL TRANSFER OF INTEL TECHNOLOGY AND TRAINING 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 

3. (C) Alcantara opened the meeting with two requests from 
Oscar Rocha. First, he said PGR would like to develop a more 
general exchange of intelligence information and capacity, 
not the case-by-case exchange we now have. Second, they 
would like for us to provide a full exchange of technology 
for use in intelligence gathering, not just the loan of 
equipment for specific cases, but the transfer of the 
know-how and training as well. Morales added that the FBI is 
helping to create a cyber-unit in Mexico but it would be 
beneficial if it were expanded and replicated more broadly. 
The SSP, she said, already has a cyber-unit but the real 
mandate rests with PGR-SIEDO. The U.S. side offered that 
there is great capacity in CCIPS in the Criminal Division and 
they would be happy to find ways to offer training and 
capacity building to their Mexican counterparts. We would be 
pleased, Breuer said, in the effort to press High Value 
Targets, to get our Mexican counterparts to the point where 
they can do these things themselves. It will take the 
development of strong trust through proper vetting and good 
training but it would be excellent to get to the point where 
there is no longer impunity for a Chapo Guzman because his 
operating space has been eliminated. 

4. (C) Rocha then spoke of the technological leap about to 
take place in the coming years in the intelligence field. He 
cited the target-finding equipment used by the USMS with 
Mexican counterparts but asked if it would be possible to 
acquire not only such equipment for GOM officials, but also 
the training and full technology transfer that would go with 
it. He suggested we work with vetted units first to provide 
such equipment and training, and then move it out more 
broadly, both to PGR and CISEN. The U.S. side suggested 
getting together in the appropriate working group to see what 
could be done. Rocha reiterated that his intent would be to 
develop indigenous to the PGR all the capacity they currently 
have only in conjunction with the USMS. 

STRATEGIC MISCALCULATIONS IN MERIDA 
----------------------------------- 

5. (C) Gutierrez Fernandez then turned to the Merida 
Initiative, saying that in retrospect he and other GOM 
officials realize that not enough strategic thought went into 
Merida in the early phase. There was too much emphasis in 
the initial planning on equipment, which they now know is 
slow to arrive and even slower to be of direct utility in the 
fight against the DTOs. Of more immediate importance is 
building institutions that can effectively use the equipment. 
He was careful to point out that all the equipment is needed 
and will be put to good use, but wishes that there had been a 
more direct focus on institution building, and supported the 
current shift in Merida focus to capacity building and 
creating more effective institutions. 

"WE HAVE EIGHTEEN MONTHS" 
------------------------- 

6. (C) Gutierrez went on to say, however, that he now 
realizes there is not even time for the institution building 
to take hold in the remaining years of the Calderon 
administration. "We have 18 months," he said, "and if we 
do not produce a tangible success that is recognizable to the 
Mexican people, it will be difficult to sustain the 
confrontation into the next administration." He lamented 
the pervasive, debilitating fear that is so much a part of 
contemporary Mexican society, where even people in the 
Yucatan, with "European levels of security" are afraid 
because of the instability in a few distant cities. He 
expressed a real concern with "losing" certain regions. It 
is damaging Mexico's international reputation, hurting 
foreign investment, and leading to a sense of government 
impotence, Gutierrez said. 

DON,T SHY AWAY FROM THE HARDEST CHALLENGES 
------------------------------------------ 

7. (C) Gutierrez believes what is needed is a clear roadmap 
for the remaining years of security cooperation between the 
U.S. and Mexico under President Calderon that targets a few 
joint projects in a few cities, rather than doing a little of 
everything. Tello Peon agreed, suggesting that there is not 
time for pilot projects, and certainly not time to work in a 
few relatively safe cities such as Nuevo Laredo as has been 
suggested, in order to develop the experience to take on the 
real challenges. 

8. (C) Instead, he believes, we need to confront the cities 
with the largest insecurity and fix them. If we could turn 
around Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and one other city such as 
Culiacan, it would solve 60% of the violence, and send a 
signal to the Mexican people that the war can be won. 
Politically, he and Gutierrez said, Mexico must succeed in 
Juarez because Calderon has staked so much of his reputation 
there, with a major show of force that, to date, has not 
panned out. Even if it is not completely solved by the time 
Calderon leaves office, if they can get things moving in the 
right direction, setting the conditions for ultimate success, 
it will be enough. There was a brief &chicken and egg8 
discussion, with one side suggesting that well-placed and 
effective federal forces could push back the DTOs 
sufficiently for the state and local forces to function, 
while others believed that well-functioning state and local 
forces will be a precondition for the federal forces to 
produce stability. 

MOVING FORWARD TOGETHER 
----------------------- 

9. (C) Gutierrez thought that to start we need a good joint 
assessment of organized criminal groups that makes explicit 
their vulnerabilities. We have, he said, five things to put 
into the fight: resources, training, joint operations, 
technology, and cooperation, and we need to mobilize 
effectively all of them. He especially mentioned the need to 
synchronize our joint efforts, citing the recent show of 
force the U.S. promised on our side of the border that could 
not be matched by anything on the Mexican side, leaving it 
hollow. Tello Peon suggested we form a planning cell, a few 
experts on each side, who could focus on a few programs in a 
few places for the next 2 years. 

10. (C) In addition to the intelligence and operational 
cooperation that would be at the heart of the new approach, 
Gutierrez and Tello Peon mentioned the importance of cultural 
and political factors. Politically, Mexico may have a 
federal system, Gutierrez said, but historically it has been 
more centralized like Colombia or France. The federal 
government, however, no longer has the ability to manage the 
system from top to bottom. He suggested it would be 
necessary for success to break through the impasse produced 
by Mexico,s currently dysfunctional federal system and 
ensure programs can be synchronized with the states. Tello 
Peon also said there will be a need to work on the cultural 
factors required to produce a &culture of lawfulness8 that 
would mobilize the societal support necessary for success. 
Culture and politics will be very complex, he said, but can 
be made to work. A clearly articulated and strong doctrine 
will help get people behind the strategy. 

11. (C) Tello Peon ended the discussion by saying he arrived 
at the dinner somewhat fatigued but would leave energized. 
He thought it was an excellent mix of people and welcomed the 
honest exchange of new ideas. Mexico, he summarized, is 
committed to staying the course, which is sustainable with a 
few clear successes. 

12. (C) Comment: We will follow up with Tello Peon and 
Gutierrez in the coming weeks to see how committed the GOM is 
to the strategy of selecting a few key cities and working to 
turn security. If it is their strategy and they plan to 
execute it, we should get behind it, using the new strategic 
framework to build a regional program to take on the biggest 
challenges in key border cities. A considerable amount could 
be done with existing funding and a marginal increase in 
staffing. We would use the remainder of the calendar year 
for planning, and have a new series of programs ready to roll 
out in the new year. 

Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 

PASCUAL 

Cable sobre la preocupación de Calderón por las intromisiones de Chávez

  • En octubre de 2009 la Embajada informa de un encuentro entre el presidente de México y el director nacional de Inteligencia de EE UU
ID:231175
Date:2009-10-23 20:57:00
Origin:09MEXICO3061
Source:Embassy Mexico
Classification:SECRET
Dunno:
Destination:VZCZCXRO8732
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #3061/01 2962057
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 232057Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8718
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQS USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 003061 

NOFORN 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, MX 
SUBJECT: DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DENNIS BLAIR'S 
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CALDERON, OCTOBER 19 

Classified By: Ambassador Carlos Pascual. 
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d). 

1. (S/NF) Summary. DNI Dennis Blair met with President 
Calderon for about forty minutes at the Presidential Palace 
on October 19. The bulk of the discussion focused on 
cooperation on intelligence sharing and the integration of 
operations by Mexican intelligence and law enforcement 
authorities. Calderon also commented extensively on 
political developments in Latin American and the role of the 
United States. While he said the United States had regained 
significant stature in Latin America, he also urged greater 
U.S. involvement in the politics of the region. Several 
upcoming elections will be critical in shaping the region's 
political course. The U.S., he said, needs to be seen as a 
critical player. End Summary. 

2. (S/NF) The issue at the heart of the discussion was that 
Mexico must continue to improve its coordination and response 
capacity among its own security forces to act effectively on 
intelligence leads regardless of the source, including 
Mexico's own internal intelligence channels. Mexico's 
Federal Police still largely bases its operational capacity 
in Mexico City. The Secretary of Defense (SEDENA) is more 
decentralized, but has yet to define a cooperative platform 
to work with the Federal Police. When operations are 
undertaken in rural areas with difficult terrain, the 
complexity of moving large security operations in a short 
time frame may often result in targeted individuals escaping 
from these operations. Calderon said this situation made him 
"very sad," and that it was a "great mistake" on their part. 
Further, Calderon indicated that he would assess the 
possibility of creating a joint strike force capability. 
(Note: In separate subsequent meetings, a discussion was 
launched with GOM officials on the possibility of undertaking 
a simulated exercise that would begin to test how multiple 
agencies could cooperate together (septel). End note.) 

3. (S/NF) Blair underscored that the fight against crime has 
to move beyond high-value targets. "Cut the head off this 
snake and new heads will grow." Blair said the key 
ingredient to success is generating community confidence to 
call in tips against drug traffickers. To get that, people 
need to feel secure -- they have to believe that the police 
can maintain public safety. And it also means that 
intelligence has to be used quickly, effectively, and 
responsibly. Intelligence, operations, and institutional 
capacity have to be interwoven. Calderon agreed. He 
responded, "You made it very clear. Without attacking the 
body as well, we can't win. And we have to create the 
capacity to take on the body." 

4. (S/NF) DNI Blair asked Calderon for his perspective on 
political developments in the region and how the United 
States could continue to increase its diplomatic 
effectiveness. Calderon emphasized that Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez is active everywhere, including Mexico. He went 
out of his way to highlight that he believes Chavez funded 
the PRD opposition during the Presidential campaign nearly 
four years ago. Chavez uses social programs, including 
sending doctors, to curry political influence, and there are 
governors in Mexico who may be friendly to him. Calderon 
said that Mexico is trying to isolate Venezuela through the 
Rio Group. Calderon also commented that he is particularly 
concerned about Venezuela's relations with Iran, and that the 
Iranian Embassy in Mexico is very active. Calderon 
underscored that Iran's growing influence in Latin American 
should be of considerable concern to the United States, and 
Chavez is doing all he can to aid and abet it. 

5. (S/NF) Calderon exhorted the U.S. to watch Guatemala and 
Belize, since their internal weaknesses make them vulnerable. 
He is concerned about Mexico's southern border, and said the 
GOM is starting a strategic planning process to better treat 
the topic. (Note: Calderon is scheduled to visit Guatemala 
next week. End note.) Calderon later in the meeting raised 
the southern border again as an area for U.S.-Mexico 
cooperation. Ambassador Pascual noted that the U.S. and 
Mexico were to hold the next day a joint conference on the 
Guatemala border to combat arms trafficking from the south. 

MEXICO 00003061 002 OF 002 



6. (S/NF) Circling back to Venezuela, Calderon said that 
Chavez has no qualms about involving himself in Latin 
American elections, and that he tried to do so in Mexico's 
own 2006 presidential contest. The region needs a visible 
U.S. presence, he noted. Chavez, said Calderon, will also 
have the opportunity to do so in a number of upcoming votes, 
especially Honduras. Most importantly, said Calderon, the 
United States must be ready to engage the next Brazilian 
president. Brazil, he said, is key to restraining Chavez, 
but he lamented that President Lula has been reluctant to do 
so. The U.S. needs to engage Brazil more and influence its 
outlook. In closing, Calderon said that there is a link 
among Iran, Venezuela, drugs, narcotics trafficking, and rule 
of law issues. The U.S. should look at Latin America from an 
interconnected perspective. 

Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
PASCUAL 

Cable sobre la intención del jefe del Ejército de establecer un estado de excepción en algunas zonas de México

En octubre de 2008 la Embajada opinaba que la iniciativa del militar no iba a prosperar tal y como sucedió


ID:231890
Date:2009-10-28 21:36:00
Origin:09MEXICO3101
Source:Embassy Mexico
Classification:SECRET
Dunno:09MEXICO2154 09MEXICO3076
Destination:VZCZCXRO2839
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #3101/01 3012136
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 282136Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8804
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQS USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003101 

NOFORN 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, MX 
SUBJECT: MEXICO: ARTICLE 29 'STATE OF EXCEPTION' -- 
UNCERTAIN RESULTS, FEW BENEFITS 

REF: A. MEXICO 3076 
B. MEXICO 2154 

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires John Feeley. 
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d). 

1. (S/NF) Summary. Defense Secretary Galvan raised recently 
the possibility of invoking Article 29 of the constitution to 
declare a state of exception in certain areas of the country 
that would provide more solid legal grounds for the 
military's role in the domestic counternarcotics (CN) fight. 
Secretary of Government Gomez Mont has alternately provided a 
different view, citing a Supreme Court decision as sufficient 
precedent for providing the military the legal basis for its 
domestic CN activities. Our analysis suggests that the legal 
benefits to invoking a state of exception are uncertain at 
best, and the political costs appear high. While the 
possibility of such a declaration cannot be discounted at 
some future date, the GOM seems far from settled on the 
efficacy or need for such an immediate move. End Summary. 

Background and Context 
---------------------- 

2. (S/NF) In an October 19 meeting with Director for 
National Intelligence Dennis Blair (ref a), Secretary of 
Defense (SEDENA) General Guillermo Galvan Galvan lamented the 
lack of legal basis for the military's domestic 
counternarcotics deployment as key to shaping the public's 
perception that the Armed Forces lack the appropriate 
authorities to conduct such operations. He noted that SEDENA 
is working to pass the National Security law (ref b), 
proposed by President Calderon in the final days of the last 
congressional session, to help shore up these legal 
foundations. Additionally, he mentioned that Article 29 of 
the Mexican constitution would permit the President to 
declare a state of exception in specific areas of crisis and 
give the military greater juridical scope to maneuver. In a 
later meeting, Secretary of Government Fernando Francisco 
Gomez Mont responded to questions by U.S. officials on the 
Article 29 issue. He contradicted Galvan's view that the 
military does not have legal basis for its domestic CN 
activities and cited a Supreme Court decision as having 
already set precedent (Note: Gomez Mont is almost certainly 
referring to a 1996 Supreme Court decision that ruled the 
military has the authority to operate at the request of local 
authorities in support of policing operations. End note.) He 
implied that the invocation of Article 29 does not have the 
legal urgency or necessity Galvan suggested, but did admit 
that the state of exception in places such as Ciudad Juarez 
"had been discussed." He said that no decision had been 
reached. 

Article 29 Text 
--------------- 

3. (S/NF) The translated text of Article 29 of the 
constitution reads: "In the event of invasion, serious 
disturbance, or any other event which may place society in 
great danger or conflict, only the President of the Mexican 
Republic, with the consent of the Council of Ministers and 
with the approval of the Federal Congress, and during 
adjournments of the latter, of the Permanent Committee, may 
suspend throughout the country or in a determined place the 
guarantees which present an obstacle to a rapid and ready 
combating of the situation; but he must do so for a limited 
time, by means of general preventive measures without such 
suspensions being limited to a specified individual. If the 
suspension should occur while the Congress is in session, the 
latter shall grant such authorizations that it deems 
necessary to enable the Executive to meet the situation. If 
the suspension occurs during a period of adjournment, the 
Congress shall be convoked without delay in order to grant 
them." 

What Would Article 29 Look Like? 
-------------------------------- 

4. (S/NF) The terms of the state of exception detailed in 
Article 29 are vague and offer little insight into how its 

MEXICO 00003101 002 OF 003 


invocation would play out on the ground. There appears to be 
a great deal of leeway for the President -- with the approval 
of Congress -- to determine what kinds of guarantees to 
suspend given the nature of the emergency at hand. To paint 
a scenario: the GOM could elect to apply the article in a 
zone of perceived crisis, such as Ciudad Juarez, for the 
period of one year. The decree could potentially suspend 
rights guaranteed in the first chapter of the constitution, 
including freedom of expression, freedom of press, freedom of 
assembly, freedom of passage, or some tenets of legal due 
process. The military, for example, might be granted broader 
detention authorities. The law does not explicitly call for 
greater military involvement, and Gomez Mont told US 
officials that it is not martial law "in the way that you 
know it." Galvan's interest in the state of exception 
suggests two possibilities: that he envisions a potentially 
broader role for the military (at the expense, perhaps, of 
cooperation with other insitutions), or that he is seeking a 
stronger legal framework and additional legal protections to 
back up the military's current domestic operations. Calderon 
has already put the military in charge of municipal police in 
Ciudad Juarez and other areas in Chihuahua State. 

5. (S/NF) The discussion of Article 29's application is 
highly theoretical. Gomez Mont, when asked whether a state 
of exception would imply the federalization of municipal 
authorities, acknowledged a "constitutional gray area." He 
admitted that municipal governments could "be limited," but 
said that Mexico's signature to the UN Human Rights Charter 
limits how far the GOM could go in suspending rights. 

The Limits 
---------- 

6. (SBU) The GOM does not take lightly its use of Article 29. 
The GOM has not, in fact, invoked it since when it declared 
war on Italy, Germany, and Japan during World War II. The 
GOM has even abstained from employing the measure during 
times of cataclysmic internal strife such as the 1968 student 
protests, the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, the 1990s fight 
against armed uprisings in Chiapas, or the 2006 Oaxaca 
protests. 

7. (C) The GOM's hesitation so far to invoke the article is 
due to a number of factors, which are particularly relevant 
given the democratic context in which Mexico now operates. 
Perhaps most critical, the article clearly stipulates that 
Congress -- meaning both Chambers -- must approve the measure 
and its various permissions, circumvention of rights, 
geographic application, and time frame, suggesting that the 
President's ability to achieve a state of exception under his 
terms would be uncertain, at best. Such a move would not be 
seen solely as a law enforcement procedure but as a carefully 
calculated move with significant political implications. 
President Calderon lacks an absolute majority in either the 
Chamber of Deputies or the Senate, and it is unlikely that 
his opponents would approve carte blanche significantly 
expanded authorities for the military or federal government. 
Indeed, Calderon instead might run the risk of having his 
hands tied by Congress, depending on the vote and final 
details of how Article 29 would be invoked. For example, the 
legislature might vote to allow the federal government to 
declare a limited state of exception in a crisis zone for a 
short period of time, asking that Calderon then return to 
Congress to renew the mandate. This would give Congress at 
least nominal oversight over the military's counternarcotics 
operations, a role it has sought but not had up to this 
point. Congress could also reject wholesale the article's 
invocation, which would be an embarrassing public blow to the 
GOM. 

8. (C) Moreover, Calderon is negotiating with Congress on 
other legislation that will better serve his counternarcotics 
goals. Proposed in late April, reforms to the National 
Security Act would provide a firmer legal framework for the 
military's domestic counterdrug fight, give the President the 
power to declare a threat to domestic security and deploy the 
military without congressional approval. It would also 
provide the military with greater intelligence authorities 
and powers over the state and local forces in the area. 

MEXICO 00003101 003 OF 003 


Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) contacts have 
indicated that they would prefer to limit presidential 
authority than expand it, and PRD Senator and member of the 
Justice Committee, Tomas Torres, has told Poloff that the 
reform as written is unlikely to pass. Nevertheless, such 
legislation permanently codifying the military's role and the 
President's authority to deploy it would certainly be of 
greater use to Calderon than would be a watered down state of 
exception. 

9. (S/NF) Gomez Mont told U.S. officials during the October 
19 exchange that the invocation of Article 29 would be 
"highly controversial," and downplayed its immediate 
necessity. The public relations cost of declaring a state of 
exception in places like Ciudad Juarez would likely be high, 
and almost certainly would draw increased scrutiny from the 
international and domestic human rights community. Moreover, 
a defeat by Congress of an Article 29 proposal would be seen 
as a public rejection of Calderon's counternarcotics strategy. 

Comment 
------- 

10. (C) Benefits to an Article 29 strategy would be limited. 
If written correctly and approved by Congress, it could give 
the military a temporary legal cover for its activities and 
perhaps allow it to focus more on operations and less on its 
critics. Notable Mexico legal experts have envisioned the 
employment of Article 29 only in the case of a "firestorm," 
such as local or state governments rejecting military 
assistance in areas where the GOM sees it as badly needed. 
Galvan's views are more reflective of the military's desire 
for legal protections on human rights and other grounds, than 
of any imminent legal or political challenges to the 
military's current domestic counternarcotics role. Clearly, 
Calderon is looking for new tools with which to fight 
increased levels of violence in places like Ciudad Juarez, 
but any benefits he would gain with an Article 29 state of 
exception would be undermined by the high political costs of 
such an approach. With questionable support in Congress and 
limited political capital, he would put at risk popular and 
congressional support that has given the military broad room 
to maneuver in the current legal framework. While the 
possibility of the declaration of a state of exception cannot 
be discounted at some future date, the GOM seems far from 
settled on the efficacy or need for such an immediate move. 

Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
FEELEY 

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