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viernes, 3 de diciembre de 2010

Cable sobre la descordinación entre el Ejército y la Marina

  • En enero de 2010 la Embajada dice que las instituciones de seguridad de México son a menudo presas de una competición

Date:2010-01-29 20:49:00
Source:Embassy Mexico
DE RUEHME #0083/01 0292049
O R 292049Z JAN 10

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 MEXICO 000083 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/29 
SUBJECT: Scenesetter for the Opening of the Defense Bilateral Working 
Group, Washington, D.C., February 1 


Classified Secret. 

1. (SBU) Summary: The inauguration of the Defense Bilateral 
Working Group (DBWG) on February 1 comes at a key moment in our 
efforts to deepen our bilateral relationship and to support the 
Mexican military's nascent steps toward modernization. On the 
heels of our bilateral joint assessments in Ciudad Juarez and 
Tijuana, as well as the GOM's move to replace the military with the 
Federal Police as lead security agency in Juarez, the DBWG can help 
ensure that the GOM stays focused on making the kinds of 
institutional improvements - including greater attention to human 
rights and broader regional participation - that are needed to 
bolster its effectiveness in the immediate fight against organized 
crime, and to position it to become a twenty first century military 
in one of the leading democracies in the region. End Summary 

2. (SBU) The DBWG is an important component of our overall 
bilateral Merida strategy for 2010. We ended 2009 with an 
unprecedented commitment from the Mexican government to work 
closely with us on an ambitious effort to move beyond a singular
focus on high value targets and address some of the institutional 
and socio-economic constraints that threaten to undermine our 
efforts to combat the cartels. A truly joint effort to implement a 
new U.S.-Mexico strategy is yielding stronger organizational 
structures and interagency cooperation on both sides and a deeper 
understanding of the threat posed by the drug trafficking 
organizations. In the coming year, we will help Mexico 
institutionalize civilian law enforcement capabilities and phase
down the military's role in conducting traditional and police 
functions. The DBWG will also provide a vehicle for Washington to 
brief the GOM on the importance of human rights issues to U.S. 
security policy, thus reinforcing a new formal Bilateral Human 
Rights Dialogue with the GOM that will include SEDENA and SEMAR.

Political and Economic Context 


3. (SBU) It is a challenging moment to address some of the 
institutional weaknesses that dot the Mexican political landscape 
and which periodically impede our larger efforts. President 
Calderon has entered the last three years of his six-year term 
facing a complicated political and economic environment. His 
National Action Party (PAN) emerged seriously weakened from a 
dramatic set-back suffered in the July congressional elections and 
was unable to recoup any real momentum during the last legislative 
session. Calderon's bold plan for ten ambitious areas for reform, 
announced in September, has yet to translate into politically 
viable initiatives. His personal popularity numbers have dropped, 
driven largely by massive economic contraction and a public sense 
that there is little strategy to create new and sustainable jobs. 
Overall, Calderon's approval ratings are still well above 50 
percent, sustained largely by his campaign against organized crime. 
Increasingly, Mexicans realize that combating DTOs is a matter of 
citizen security, and thus support a tough stance. Yet the failure 
to reduce violence is also a liability. 

4. (SBU) Meanwhile, the opposition Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI) is in the ascendency, cautiously managing its illusory 
unity in an effort to dominate the twelve gubernatorial contests
this year and avoid missteps that could jeopardize its front-runner 
status in the run-up to the 2012 presidential elections. With a 

MEXICO 00000083 002 OF 005 

strategy best described as political pragmatism, PRI insiders 
indicate that the party is unlikely to support any major reform 
efforts over the next several years - no matter how necessary - 
that could be publicly controversial. Slow economic recovery and
budgetary pressures are reducing government resources and 
complicating the government's ability to balance priorities and 
come up with a compelling and sustainable narrative that ties the 
fight against organized crime to the daily concerns of most 
Mexicans. Mexico's rapidly declining oil production, a 
projected six to seven percent GDP contraction in 2009, a slow 
recovery in 2010, and a 47 percent poverty rate all present 
difficult challenges for the Calderon administration in 2010. 
Still, we see no "softening" of the administration's resolve to 
confront the DTOs head on. 

Security Challenges 


5. (C) Calderon has aggressively attacked Mexico's drug 
trafficking organizations but has struggled with an unwieldy and
uncoordinated interagency and spiraling rates of violence that have 
made him vulnerable to criticism that his anti-crime strategy has 
failed. Indeed, the GOM's inability to halt the escalating numbers 
of narco-related homicides in places like Ciudad Juarez and 
elsewhere - the nationwide total topped 7,700 in 2009 - has become 
one of Calderon's principal political liabilities as the general
public has grown more concerned about citizen security. Mexican 
security institutions are often locked in a zero-sum competition in 
which one agency's success is viewed as another's failure, 
information is closely guarded, and joint operations are all but
unheard of. Official corruption is widespread, leading to a 
compartmentalized siege mentality among "clean" law enforcement 
leaders and their lieutenants. Prosecution rates for organized 
crime-related offenses are dismal; two percent of those detained
are brought to trail. Only 2 percent of those arrested in Ciudad
Juarez have even been charged with a crime. 

6. (S) The failure to reduce violence has focused attention on 
the military's perceived failures and led to a major course change 
in January to switch the overall command in Ciudad Juarez from the 
military to the federal police. The military was not trained to 
patrol the streets or carry out law enforcement operations. It 
does not have the authority to collect and introduce evidence into 
the judicial system. The result: arrests skyrocketed, 
prosecutions remained flat, and both the military and public have 
become increasingly frustrated. The command change in Juarez has
been seen by political classes and the public as a Presidential 
repudiation of SEDENA. When SEDENA joins you at the DBWG, it will 
be an agency smarting from the very public statement of a lack of 
confidence in its performance record in Juarez. 

7. (C) Below the surface of military professionalism, there is 
also considerable tension between SEDENA and SEMAR. SEMAR 
succeeded in the take down of Arturo Beltran Leyva, as well as with 
other major targets. Aside from the perceived failure of its 
mission in Juarez, SEDENA has come to be seen slow and risk averse 
even where it should succeed: the mission to capture HVTs. The 
risk is that the more SEDENA is criticized, the more risk averse
it will become. The challenge you face in the DBWG is to convince 
them that modernization and not withdrawal are the way forward, and 
that transparency and accountability are fundamental to 
modernization. There is no alternative in today's world of 
information technology. 

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8. (C) The DBWG is just one mechanism for addressing the 
challenge of modernization. SEDENA's shortfalls are at times quite 
noticeable and serve for dramatic charges on human rights and other 
grounds. We have actively sought to encourage respect for the 
military's role in Mexican society and tread carefully with regard 
to the larger theme of military modernization. What SEDENA, and to 
a lesser extent SEMAR, need most is a comprehensive, interactive
discussion that will encourage them to look holistically at 
culture, training and doctrine in a way that will support 
modernization and allow them to address a wider range of military 
missions. This is where the DBWG can help. 

9. (C) Currently, the military is the lightening rod for 
criticism of the Calderon Administration's security policies. We
are having some success in influencing the GOM to transition the
military to secondary support functions in Juarez. Still, the GOM's 
capacity to replicate the Juarez model is limited. They simply 
lack the necessary numbers of trained federal police to deploy them 
in such numbers in more than a few cities. There are changes in 
the way that the military can interact with vetted municipal 
police, as we have seen in Tijuana, that produce better results.
But in the near term, there is no escaping that the military will 
play a role in public security. 

10. (C) Military surges that are not coordinated with local city
officials and civilian law enforcement, particularly local 
prosecutors, have not worked. In Ciudad Juarez, a dramatic 
increase in troop deployments to the city early last year brought a 
two-month reduction in violence levels before narcotics-related 
violence spiked again. The DTOs are sophisticated players: they 
can wait out a military deployment; they have an almost unlimited 
human resource pool to draw from in the marginalized neighborhoods; 
and they can fan complaints about human rights violations to 
undermine any progress the military might make with hearts and 

11. (SBU) SEDENA lacks arrest authority and is incapable of 
processing information and evidence for use in judicial cases. It 
has taken a serious beating on human rights issues from 
international and domestic human rights organizations, who argue
with considerable basis, in fact that the military is ill-equipped 
for a domestic policing role. While SEDENA has moved to address 
human rights criticisms, its efforts are mechanistic and wrapped in 
a message that often transmits defensiveness about bringing a 
hermetically sealed military culture into the twenty-first century. 
The military justice system (fuero militar) is used not only for a 
legitimate prosecutorial function, but also to preserve the 
military's institutional independence. Even the Mexican Supreme 
Court will not claim civilian jurisdiction over crimes involving
the military, regardless of whether a military mission is involved. 
Fortunately, the Mexican military is under increasing pressure to 
change on a number of fronts. A recent Inter-American Human Rights 
Court ruling found Article 57 of Mexico's code of military justice, 
which effectively allows the military to keep all violators within 
its own justice system, violate Mexico's constitution and mandated 
improvements in the way cases involving alleged human rights abuses 
by the military are handled. A report issued by Amnesty 
International in December noted that complaints to the National 
Commission on Human Rights against the military increased from 367 
in 2007 to over 2000 from 2008-June 2009. 

MEXICO 00000083 004 OF 005 

Change on the Horizon 


12. (SBU) Calderon has undertaken serious reforms since coming to 
office, but he also must tread carefully in dealing with the 
Mexican military. With our help, he has refined his anti-crime 
strategy and made significant progress in a number of important 
areas, including inaugurating a new Federal Police command and 
intelligence center, establishing stronger vetting mechanisms for 
security officials, and constructing information-sharing databases 
to provide crime fighting data to various federal, state, and local 
elements. Calderon also has recognized that the blunt-force 
approach of major military deployments has not curbed violence in 
zones like Ciudad Juarez, and has replaced SEDENA forces with 
Federal Police officers as the lead security agency in urban Ciudad 

13. (C) These steps reflect the GOM's willingness to respond to 
public pressure and to focus on building strong, civilian law 
enforcement institutions that are necessary for sustained success 
against organized crime in Mexico. Indeed, Public Security 
Secretary Genaro Garcia Luna has sought to raise the standards of 
his Federal Police so it is capable of gradually replacing the 
military's role in public security through improved hiring, 
training, and vetting practices. With new authorities granted 
under federal police reform legislation passed last year, including 
a broadened wire-tapping mandate, the SSP is well-placed to 
significantly expand its investigative and intelligence-collection 
capabilities. The GOM is exploring new ways to bring local and 
state police up to standards to support the anti-crime fight. 
Federal judicial reform has been slower in coming, but the Attorney 
General's Office (PGR) is looking to modernize as an institution. 
For example, PGR created with USG assistance the Constanza Project 
(Justicia Para Todos), a $200 million dollar initiative designed to 
transform PGR's culture, in part by promoting transparency, 
training attorneys to build stronger cases, and digitizing files in 
order to incorporate a paperless system less susceptible to 

14. (C) USG assistance has been crucial to these efforts, and we
are looking ahead to ensure that we help Mexico build its most key 
institutions with seamless integration of operations, 
investigations, intelligence, prosecutions, and convictions. Joint 
assessment missions -- one to Tijuana and San Diego and one to 
Ciudad Juarez and El Paso - were designed to further guide our 
bilateral efforts and address one potential weakness -- the 
dysfunctionally low level of collaboration between Mexican military 
and civilian authorities along the border. The Tijuana assessment 
was completed December 3-4 and Ciudad Juarez's January 14-15. 
Mexico also has agreed to explore a task force model for joint 
intelligence and operations, and Mexico's intelligence civilian 
intelligence service, CISEN, has been charged with overseeing such 
efforts. We need to develop new programs to build a greater 
intelligence fusion capability, and continue to support the Federal 
Police's own institutional development and training capacity, and 
swifter implementation of judicial reform. Moreover, with many of 
our federal programs well underway, we are broadening our efforts 
to include work at the state level. 

Military Modernization Key 


MEXICO 00000083 005 OF 005 

15. (S) In this context, it is absolutely necessary that we 
intensify our efforts to encourage modernization of the Mexican 
military. General Galvan Galvan, head of SEDENA, is an impressive 
military man with an appreciation for the uncomfortable, 
non-traditional challenges facing the Mexican military forces. But 
he is also a political actor who has succeeded, at least in part, 
by protecting the military's prerogatives and symbolic role. His
experience provides him with little guidance on how to manage 
change and modernization against a backdrop of criticism and often 
vitrolic accusations. Historically, suspicion of the United States 
has been a prime driver of a military bureaucratic culture that has 
kept SEDENA closed to us. We believe Galvan is committed to at 
least following orders when it comes to Calderon's vision of a more 
modern Mexican state and a closer relationship with the United 
States. Our ties with the military have never been closer in terms 
of not only equipment transfers and training, but also the kinds of 
intelligence exchanges that are essential to making inroads against 
organized crime. Incipient steps towards logistical 
interoperability with U.S. forces are ongoing related to Haiti 
relief. SEDENA, for the first time and following SEMAR's lead, has 
asked for SOF training. We need to capitalize on these cracks in
the door. Any retreat on engagement on our side will only 
reinforce SEDENA's instincts to revert to a closed and 
unaccountable institution. 

16. (C) Our engagement on human rights in the DBWG must also be 
carefully structured. Presentations from the U.S. side on how 
human rights play into our conduct of military and security policy 
will be constructive. It will be useful to transmit to SEDENA the 
kinds of systemic human rights concerns that arise in Washington. 
But neither SEDENA nor SEMAR will engage in a dialogue on human 
rights in the DBWG. That will be reserved for the ad hoc meeting
of the Bilateral Human Right Dialogue with Paul Stockton scheduled 
for Mexico City on February 12. 

17. (C) SEDENA and SEMAR still have a long way to go toward 
modernization. The DBWG can go a long way in addressing a number
of key points. We have seen some general officers, in Tijuana for 
example, who are looking for ways to build links between units in 
the field and local prosecutors, but this has not been done 
systematically. It needs to be encouraged. Encouraging the 
Mexican military to participate more actively in the international 
arena, such as through greater security cooperation outreach to 
Central America and Colombia, and even with limited participation 
in regional humanitarian ops to possibly peacekeeping, will also be 
key to helping the military transition from a mentality of 
"Protecting the Revolution" to a more active, dynamic, and flexible 
force. SEDENA and SEMAR share the parochial, risk-averse habits 
that often plague their civilian counterparts in Mexican law 
enforcement agencies. While the Navy's capture of Beltran Leyva 
may up the ante and encourage innovation by competition between 
security services, both SEDENA and SEMAR have serious work to do on 
working more effectively and efficiently with their security 

Cable sobre la ayuda de EE UU en la lucha contra el narcotráfico

  • En diciembre de 2009 el embajador Carlos Pascual cuenta que se arrestó a un importante capo gracias a la colaboración estadounidense

Date:2009-12-17 20:42:00
Source:Embassy Mexico
DE RUEHME #3573/01 3512042
R 172042Z DEC 09

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003573 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019 


Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado. 
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d). 

1. (S) Summary. Mexican Navy forces acting on U.S. 
information killed Arturo Beltran Leyva in an operation on 
December 16, the highest-level takedown of a cartel figure 
under the Calderon administration. The operation is a clear 
victory for the Mexican Government and an example of 
excellent USG-GOM cooperation. The unit that conducted the 
operation had recieved extensive U.S. training. Arturo 
Beltran Leyva's death will not solve Mexico's drug problem, 
but it will hopefully generate the momentum necessary to make 
sustained progress against other drug trafficking 
organizations. End Summary. 

The Operation 

2. (S) Mexican Navy (SEMAR) sources revealed on the night of 
December 17 that SEMAR forces killed Arturo Beltran Leyva 
(ABL), head of the Beltran Leyva Organization, during a 
shoot-out in Cuernavaca (approximately 50 miles south of 
Mexico City) that afternoon. At least three other cartel 
operatives were killed during the raid, with a fourth 
committing suicide. While it still has not been confirmed, 
Embassy officials believe the latter to be ABL's brother, 
Hector, which would mean that all Beltran Leyva brothers are 
either dead or in prison. Arturo Beltran Leyva has a long 
history of involvement in the Mexican drug trade, and worked 
with Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman and his Sinaloa Cartel before 
splitting in 2008. The rivalry between the Sinaloa and 
Beltran Leyva organizations has been a key factor driving the 
escalating levels of narcotics-related violence in recent 
years. Born in Sinaloa, ABL has been key to the importation 
and distribution of cocaine and heroin in the United States, 
and also has extensive money laundering capabilities, 
corruption networks, and international contacts in Colombia 
and the U.S. 

3. (C) Embassy law enforcement officials say that the arrest 
operation targeting ABL began about a week prior to his death 
when the Embassy relayed detailed information on his location 
to SEMAR. The SEMAR unit has been trained extensively by 
NORTHCOM over the past several years. SEMAR raided an 
identified location, where they killed several ABL bodyguards 
and arrested over 23 associates, while ABL and Hector 
escaped. On Monday, the Embassy interagency linked ABL to an 
apartment building located in Cuernavaca (about an hour south 
of Mexico City), where ABL was in hiding. SEMAR initiated an 
arrest operation on Wednesday afternoon, surrounding the 
identified apartment complex, and establishing a security 
perimeter. ABL's forces fired on the SEMAR operatives and 
engaged in a sustained firefight that wounded three SEMAR 
marines and possibly killed one. SEMAR forces evacuated 
residents of the apartment complex to the gym, according to 
press accounts, and no civilian casualties have so far been 

The Mexican Interagency 

4. (S) The successful operation against ABL comes on the 
heels of an aggressive SEMAR effort in Monterrey against Zeta 
forces (ref a) and highlights its emerging role as a key 
player in the counternarcotics fight. SEMAR is well-trained, 
well-equipped, and has shown itself capable of responding 
quickly to actionable intelligence. Its success puts the 
Army (SEDENA) in the difficult position of explaining why it 
has been reluctant to act on good intelligence and conduct 
operations against high-level targets. The U.S. interagency 
originally provided the information to SEDENA, whose refusal 
to move quickly reflected a risk aversion that cost the 
institution a major counternarcotics victory. SEDENA did 
provide backup to SEMAR during the firefight with ABL forces, 
but can take little credit for the operation. Public 
Security Secretary (SSP) Genaro Garcia Luna can also be 
counted as a net loser in the Mexican interagency following 
the ABL operation. SSP considers high-level Beltran Leyva 
targets to be its responsibility, and Garcia Luna has already 

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said privately that the operation should have been his. 

The Impact on Violence 

5. (S) It is early to say with a great degree of confidence 
what kind of effect ABL's death will have on levels of 
narco-related violence in Mexico. A spike is probably likely 
in the short term as inter- and intra-cartel battles are 
intensified by the sudden leadership gap in one of the 
country's most important cartels. With all the Beltran Leyva 
brothers likely dead or in prison, there are a number of 
other cartel functionaries likely to vie for the leadership 
slot. Moreover, rival organizations may intensify efforts to 
expand their influence in the disarray likely to follow ABL's 
death. At the very least, efforts to clean the Beltran Leyva 
house and rout out suspected informers will be bloody, and 
retaliation by the organization against Mexican law 
enforcement or military officials is not out of the cards. 

6. (C) In the medium to longer term, ABL's death could have 
the potential to lower the level of narco-violence rates. 
ABL himself was a particularly violent leader with numerous 
effective assassin teams. Moreover, the Sinaloa-Beltran 
Leyva rivalry has been responsible for a large number of 
narcotics-related homicides in Mexico, and also largely 
personally driven by the Beltran Leyva brothers themselves. 
Emboffs speculate that Beltran Leyva associates, under 
pressure and perhaps more vulnerable due to leadership 
deficiencies, could move to align more closely again with 
Sinaloa, which they might think offers a more natural 
protection than the Zetas. 

The Boost for Calderon 

7. (C) SEMAR's successful operation against ABL is a major 
victory for President Calderon and his war against organized 
crime. ABL is the highest ranking target taken down by the 
Calderon government, and his status as one of the most 
important and long-standing of Mexican drug traffickers makes 
his takedown even more symbolically important. President 
Calderon has openly admitted to having a tough year -- his 
party lost big in the midterm elections, he is confronting an 
economic crisis, and nationwide homicide rates continue to 
climb -- and contacts have told Poloff that he has seemed 
"down" in meetings. The SEMAR operation is undoubtedly a 
huge boost for him, both in terms of bolstering public 
support for his security efforts and in reassuring himself 
that important security accomplishments in this area are 
possible. Calderon's political opponents will also find it 
far less useful to accuse the President of hanging on to an 
ineffective anti-crime strategy that nets numerous mid- to 
low-level cartel figures but fails to rein in the major 
kingpins. The major Mexico City dailies have run front page 
Beltran Leyva stories, and President Calderon's remarks in a 
press conference from Copenhagen highlighting that the 
operation represents an "important achievement for the 
Mexican people and government" were widely covered. 


8. (S) The operation against Arturo Beltran Leyva is a clear 
victory for the Mexican Government and an example of 
excellent USG-GOM cooperation. Seamless Embassy interagency 
collaboration combined with a willing, capable, and ready 
SEMAR produced one of the greatest successes to date in the 
counternarcotics fight. ABL's death will provide an 
important boost to Calderon and hopefully will cultivate a 
greater sense of confidence within Mexican security agencies 
that will encourage them to take greater advantage of similar 
opportunities. SEMAR's win in particular may encourage 
SEDENA to be more proactive and less risk averse in future 
operations. ABL's death will certainly not resolve Mexico's 
drug problem, but it will likely generate the momentum 
necessary within the GOM security apparatus to make sustained 
and real progress against the country's drug trafficking 

Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 

MEXICO 00003573 003 OF 003 and the North American 
Partnership Blog at / 

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